In this study, we investigate fundamental trade-off among identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in biometric identification system. Ignatenko and Willems (2015) studied this system assuming that the channel in the enrollment process of the system is noiseless. In the enrollment process, however, it is highly considerable that noise occurs when biodata is scanned. In this paper, we impose a noisy channel in the enrollment process and establish the capacity region of the rate tuples. The obtained result shows that this result reduces to the one given by Ignatenko and Willems (2015) as a special case where the enrollment channel is noiseless.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric security is a security mechanism used to identify an individual on the basis of his/her physical characteristics. Biometric technology enables us to recognize the individual by matching the unique feature with biological data (biodata) previously stored in the system database. Nowadays many applications make use of this technology like homeland checking at land port, mobile payment with smart phone, etc.
O'Sullivan and Schmid [10] and Willems et al. [12] separately introduced the discrete memoryless biometric identification system (BIS). Basically, the BIS consists of two phases: (I) Enrollment Phase and (II) Identification Phase. In (I) Enrollment Phase, all individuals' bio-data sequences are generated from a stationary memoryless source. The sequences are observed through a noisy discrete memoryless channel (DMC) and stored into system database. In (II) Identification Phase, a bio-data sequence of an unknown individual is observed via another noisy DMC, and an estimated value of the unknown individual is output.
There are many studies related to the BIS. We highlight some previous studies which are connected to this study. Willems et al. [12] have clarified the identification capacity of the BIS. However, the implementation in [12] considered bio-data sequences are stored in the system database in a plain form, leading to a critical privacy leakage threat. Tuncel [11] has extended their model by incorporating compression of biodata sequences stored in the system database and clarified the capacity region of identification and coding rates (In this study, a helper data or codeword is called a template, and this coding rate is called the template rate). Later, Ignatenko and Willems [6] investigated the BIS model with secret data and template generation. Related to this work, the system with only secret data generation has been considered in [4] , [5] , [8] , and [9] . In [6] , the authors evaluated the amount of information leaked from a template stored in the database, called the privacy-leakage rate, and clarified the fundamental trade-off among identification, secrecy and privacy-leakage rates in the BIS provided that the enrollment channel is noiseless. Furthermore, Yachongka and Yagi [13] analyzed the model developed in [6] by adding constraint of template rate and clarified the fundamental trade-off among identification, secrecy and template rates in the BIS.
An interesting observation given in [6] for the case where the secrecy rate is zero and in [13] for the case where the secrecy rate is positive indicates that the minimum template rate is equal to the minimum privacy-leakage rate when the enrollment channel is noiseless. Despite this insight, when bio-data is scanned, it is highly considerable that bio-data sequences are subject to noise, as is assumed in [11] and [12] . this type of model is also known as a remote or hidden source model. Actually, by treating a noisy channel, it makes the problem more challenging and interesting, especially, in the evaluation of the privacy-leakage rate, which has been pointed out in [4] for the system with only secret data generation. This motivates us to consider a noisy channel in the enrollment process with privacy protection.
In this paper, we derive the capacity region of identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in the BIS. We analyze the region under conditions that 1) there is a noisy channel in the enrollment phase, 2) we consider a scheme of both compressing template (as in [11] ) and protecting privacy (as in [6] ), 3) we analyze the capacity region provided that the prior distribution of an identified individual is unknown.
To handle the bottleneck of evaluating privacy-leakage in the achievability proof, we introduce an auxiliary random variable (RV) corresponding to a template. The obtained characteriza-812 978-1-5386-9291-2/19/$31.00 ©2019 IEEE ISIT 2019 tion of the region is basically different from the ones derived in [4] , [6] , and [13] . As a special case, it can be checked that our result reduces to the one in [6] where the enrollment channel is noiseless.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we define notation used in this paper and describe the details of the system model.
A. Notation
Calligraphic A stands for a finite alphabet. Upper-case A denotes a random variable (RV) taking values in A and lowercase a ∈ A denotes its realization. P A (a) := Pr[A = a], a ∈ A, represents the probability distribution on A, and P A n represents the probability distribution of RV A n = (A 1 , · · · , A n ) in A n , the n-th Cartesian product of A. P A n B n represents the joint probability distribution of a pair of RVs (A n , B n ) and its conditional probability distribution P A n |B n is defined as P A n |B n (a n |b n ) = P A n B n (a n ,b n )
for any a n ∈ A n , b n ∈ B n such that P B n (b n ) > 0. Throughout this paper, logarithms are of base two. For integers a and b such that a < b, [a, b] denotes the set of {a, a + 1, · · · , b}. A partial sequence of a sequence c n from the first symbol to the tth symbol (c 1 , · · · , c t ) is represented by c t .
A sequence x n ∈ X n is said to be δ-strongly typical with respect to distribution P X if | 1 n N (a|x n ) − P X (a)| ≤ δ and P X (a) = 0 implies 1 n N (a|x n ) = 0 for all a ∈ X , where N (a|x n ) is the number of occurrences of a in the sequence x n , and δ is an arbitrary positive number. The set of sequences x n ∈ X n such that x n is δ-strongly typical is called the strongly typical set and denoted by A (n) ϵ (X). This concept is easily extended to joint distributions.
B. Model Descriptions
The BIS model assumed in this paper is shown in Fig. 1 . As we have previously mentioned, it consists of two phases: (I) Enrollment Phase and (II) Identification Phase. Next we explain the details of each phase. (I)Enrollment Phase:
Let I = {1, 2, · · · M I } and X be the set of indexes of individuals and a finite source alphabet, respectively. For any i ∈ I, we assume that x n i = (x i1 , · · · , x in ) ∈ X n , an n-length bio-data sequence of individual i, is generated i.i.d. from a stationary memoryless source P X . The generating probability for each sequence
be the set of indexes of templates stored in database and individuals' secret data, respectively. All bio-data sequences are observed via a stationary DMC {Y, P Y |X , X }, where Y is a finite output-alphabet of P Y |X . The corresponding probability that 
The probability that x n w ∈ X n is output as z n = (z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n ) ∈ Z n via P Z|X is given by
The sequence z n is passed to the decoder g : Z n × J MI −→ I × S, which compares z n with templates in the database and outputs the pair of estimated value ( w, s(w)).
and Z n for an arbitrary i ∈ I. In this paper, we assume neither that the identified individual index W are uniformly distributed over I nor that there is a prior distribution of W .
III. DEFINITIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
The formal definition of the addressed problem and the main theorem of this study are given bellow.
Definition 1.
A tuple of an identification, secrecy, template, privacy-leakage rates (R I , R S , R J , R L ) is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and large enough n there exist pairs of encoders and decoders that satisfy for all i ∈ I
1
Moreover, the capacity region R is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rates tuples.
In Definition 1, (4) is the condition of identification error probability of individual i which should be arbitrarily small. Equations (5), (6) and (7) are the constraints related to identification, template and secrecy rates, respectively. In terms of the privacy protection perspective, we measure the information leakage of individual i by (8) and (9) . Condition (8) measures the amount of privacy leakage of original bio-data X n i from template J(i) in the database and it must be smaller than or equal to R L + δ. Later, we will see that the evaluation for R L is the most intricate task. Condition (9) measures the secrecy leakage between the template in the database and the secret data of individual i and it requires that the leaked amount is smaller than or equal to δ. Theorem 1. The capacity region for the BIS is given by
where RVs X, Y , Z, U , and V form a Markov chain
, a}, and V and U take values in some finite alphabets U and V with |U| ≤ (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 1) and |V| ≤ |Y| + 2.
In Theorem 1, the capacity region is characterized by two RVs U and V . If the privacy-leakage rate is not considered (i.e., R L can be arbitrarily large) and/or the enrollment channel is noiseless (i.e., Y = X), the second auxiliary RV V is not necessary. For instance, when there is no constraint on R L , let R ′ be the capacity region of achievable rate tuple (R I , R S , R J ). We immediately obtain the following corollary from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The capacity region R
where U is an auxiliary RV taking values in some finite alphabet U with |U| ≤ |Y| + 1. X) , the addressed problem in Corollary 1 without constraint (8) reduces to the system analyzed in [13] . Also, this problem turns out to be equivalent to the one investigated in [6] , where (8) is imposed instead of (6) . The capacity region is given by replacing R L with R J and Y with X in (11) , which is identical to the one derived in [6] .
Remark 2. When the enrollment channel is noiseless (Y =
In Corollary 1, the capacity region can be characterized by one auxiliary RV. Similarly, the characterization of the capacity region in [4] also needs one auxiliary RV in case the identification rate is 0. On the other hand, the result derived in this paper requires two auxiliary RVs to characterize the capacity region as shown in Theorem 1. The difference between zero (as in [4] ) and positive (as in this study) identification rates are crucial in the analysis of R L in the achievability proof. We have not yet found any method to establish Theorem 1 by using only one auxiliary RV at the moment.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1

A. Achievability (Direct Part)
First, we fix δ > 0 and a block length n. We choose test channels P U |Y and P V |U . We select any pair of (R I ,
We also set M I = 2 nRI , M S = 2 nRS , and M J = 2 nRJ .
Random Code Generation:
Sequences v n m are generated i.i. 
Encoding (Enrollment):
When encoder f observes the bio-data sequence y n i ∈ Y n , it determines the pair of j(i) and s(i). The encoder looks for m and k satisfying (y n i , v n m , u n k|m ) ∈ A (n) ϵ (Y V U ). We set j(i) =j(m) and s(i) =s(k, m), and j(i) is stored at position i in the database and s(i) is handed back to individual i. In case there do not exist such m and k or there are multiple pairs of m and k , we set j(i) =j(1) and s(i) =s(1, 1).
Decoding (Identification):
When decoder g observes z n ∈ Z n , it finds m and k such that (z n , v n m , u n k|m ) ∈ A s(1, 1) ). We set ( w, s(w)) = g(z n , j(1), · · · , j(M I )).
Evaluation:
Next we shall check the conditions of (4)-(9) in Definition 1 averaged over randomly chosen codebook C n . Due to the space limitation, we show only the bound of (8) in this part. For detailed proofs of the bounds of (4)- (7) , and (9), we recommend that the readers refer to [14] .
We denote by V n i the corresponding to v n m chosen by the encoder given Y n i = y n i . Before advancing further, we describe a key lemma that plays important role in the evaluation of privacy-leakage rate. Lemma 1. (Kittichokechai et al. [7] ) Assume that (X n i , Y n i , V n i ) are ϵ-strongly typical with high probability 1 . Then, it holds that
where δ n denotes some positive value satisfying δ n ↓ 0 as n → ∞.
(Proof) The proof can be found in [7, Appendix C] .
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
This is the step why we need the second auxiliary RV V in addition to U . From (8) , it holds that
where (a) follows from the Markov chain X n i − V n i − J(i) and (b) follows because the number of possible values of V n i given C n is M J . Here, we evaluate the second term in (13) as
where (c) follows because Y n i and X n i are independent of C n , (d) follows from Lemma 1, and (e) follows because conditioning reduces entropy. From (13) and (14), we obtain
for all sufficiently large n. Finally, using the selection lemma [1, Lemma 2.2], there exists a codebook satisfying all the conditions in Definition 1 for large enough n.
B. Converse Part
For the converse proof, we consider a more relaxed case where identified individual index W is uniformly distributed over I and (4) is replaced with the average error criterion
We shall show that the capacity regionis contained in the righthand side of (10) . We assume that a rate tuple (R I , R S , R J , R L ) is achievable so that there exists a pair of encoder and decoder (f, g) such 1 It means that Pr{(
denotes the set of ϵ-strongly typical sequences. that all conditions in Definition 1 with replacing (4) by (16) are satisfied for any δ > 0 and large enough n.
Here, we provide another lemma used in this part. For t ∈ [1, , n], we define auxiliary RVs U t and V t as U t = (Z t−1 , J(W ), S(W )) and V t = (Z t−1 , J(W )), respectively. We denote a sequence of RVs X n W = (X 1 (W ), · · · , X n (W )) and Y n W = (Y 1 (W ), · · · , Y n (W )). Lemma 2. There exist some RVs U and V which satisfy 
and thus
Furthermore, we verify the range of R I . From (17), we have
We further expand the second term in (21). We introduce new RVsỸ n W ,Z n ,J(W ), andS(W ) taking values in Y n , Z n , J , and S, respectively, whose distributions satisfy
Note that we can always pick these RVs. Equation (23) for any t ∈ [1, n] . Then, by the chain rule of mutual information, we obtain
where (a) follows due to (25). Then,
From (5), (19), (21), and (27), we obtain
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
From (8), it holds that n(R L + δ)
where (b) holds due to Z t−1 − (X t−1 (W ), J(W )) − X t (W ) which can be proved by similar arguments in [5, Appendix B] and the last equality in (29) follows from (18) in Lemma 2. For proving the bound on the cardinalities of the sets of U and V, we use the the support lemma in [3, Lemma 15.4 ] to show that |V| should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve P V |U and three more elements I(Z; U ), I(Y ; V ) and I(X; V ). It means |V| ≤ |Y| + 2. Similarly, it can be proved that the size of set |U| should have at most (|Y| + 2)(|Y| + 1) by the argument in [2, Appendix] .
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the fundamental trade-off among identification, secrecy, template, privacy-leakage rates in the BIS. Compared to the model proposed in [6] and [11] , what we imposed to our model are: treating the enrollment channel as noisy channel, considering a scheme of both compressing templates (as in [11] ) and privacy protection (as in [6] ), and analyzing the capacity region provided that the prior distribution of identified individual is unknown.
The obtained result showed that the characterization of the capacity region required two auxiliary RVs. This is basically different from the result of the original works in [6] and [11] . As a special case, when the privacy-leakage rate can be arbitrarily large and the enrollment channel is noiseless, the capacity region of (R I , R S , R J ) can be characterized by only one auxiliary RV (cf. Corollary 1) and the region is expressed in the same form as in [13] and equivalent to the one derived in [6] . It is future work to verify if Theorem 1 can be recharacterized by only one auxiliary RV as is shown in [4] - [6] .
